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Abstract
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variation possible within it. In this article we develop indices for comparing employment-based parental leave policies on
three dimensions of social equality: inclusion, gender equality and redistribution. This combination offers an extension
of classificatory schemes for parental leave policies and a broader basis for comparative analysis. We compare Australia
and Japan on these indices and present a qualitative exploration of the origins and implications of their similarities and
differences. The analysis draws attention to tensions between the three indices, illustrating intersecting and conflicting
influences on the potential for paid parental leave entitlements to contribute to the amelioration of social inequalities.
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the need for complementary measures to advance egalitarian outcomes.
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1. Introduction
Social inequalities associated with parental leave poli-
cies continue to comprise a major theme in leave policy
research,with divisions between the “parental-leave rich
and parental-leave poor” (McKay, Mathieu, & Doucet,
2016) potentially widening within and between coun-
tries. This is particularly the case for employment-based
entitlements in the context of widespread fragmenta-
tion of work and the expansion of non-standard and
insecure forms of employment in what Palier (2018,
p. 247) depicts as “a long-term dualisation trajectory.”
Such trends clearly have the capacity to narrow the
reach of employment entitlements such as paid parental
leave in ways that exacerbate social inequalities (see,
e.g., Howcroft & Rubery, 2019; Whitehouse & Brady,
2019). In addition to concerns about access, it has long
been recognised that parental leave policies may rein-
force rather than ameliorate gendered divisions of paid
and unpaid labour and adversely affect women’s employ-
ment trajectories (for an overview see Hegewisch &
Gornick, 2011). A less frequently noted issue is that
income inequalitymay also be consolidated among users
of parental leave entitlements depending on the extent
to which the distribution of payments is ‘regressive’ (i.e.,
delivering greater benefits to higher-earning parents)
rather than ‘progressive’ (i.e., relatively advantageous
to the lower paid). This adds to the impact of unequal
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access, which has been shown to disproportionately ben-
efit the social reproduction of higher social strata (see,
e.g., Ghysels & Van Lancker, 2011; McKay et al., 2016;
O’Brien, 2009).
In this article we compare employment-based paid
parental leave provisions in Australia and Japan, assess-
ing their implications for these three dimensions of social
equality, which we label inclusion, gender equality and
redistribution. The focus is thus on policy design rather
than uptake and impact, forwhich there are insufficiently
detailed cross-nationally comparable statistics. Our com-
parative analysis of social equality in policy design never-
theless offers contributions at two levels, first in extend-
ing classificatory schemes for cross-national comparison
of parental leave policies and, second, in highlighting con-
trasting possibilities in practice through a comparison
of Australia and Japan. As non-European countries that
fall into the same broad parental-leave entitlement type
in Dobrotić and Blum’s (2020, p. 593) 2×2 matrix, both
having primarily employment-based entitlement princi-
ples and selective rather than universal eligibility criteria,
Australia and Japan illustrate the wide variation possible
within this category, raising questions over the origins
and implications of their policy differences. These are
explored with the goal of extending understanding of
the complexities of designing policy for social objectives
within employment-based systems and the barriers that
stand in the way of egalitarian outcomes.
In the following section we outline our framework
for analysis, explaining ourmethodological approach and
the indices we have constructed to represent the three
dimensions of social equality. We present our compar-
ative analysis of Australia and Japan in the subsequent
section, identifying and interrogating differences in their
performance. In conclusion, we reflect on the drivers
of variations within and between these employment-
based entitlement models, the contradictions they illus-
trate between our three indices, and the implications for
future policy directions.
2. A Framework for Analysis
Cross-national comparison offers insights into the vari-
ety of policy possibilities and deeper understandings of
extent to which national contexts shape policy fram-
ings and potential future directions. It has been widely
applied in research on parental leave policy, informed by
classifications ranging from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) lib-
eral, conservative and social democratic welfare regimes,
through critical extensions of this typology in gen-
dered family models and care regimes based on notions
of (de)familialisation and maternalism (e.g., Crompton,
1999; Leitner, 2003; Lewis, 2001; Mathieu, 2016), to
the development of classifications to represent the gen-
erosity and gender egalitarianism of parental leave pol-
icy provisions (e.g., Blofield & Martínez Franzoni, 2015;
Castro-García & Pazod-Moran, 2016; Ciccia & Verloo,
2012; Dearing, 2016; Gornick & Meyers, 2003, 2008;
Javornik, 2014; Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010; Smith
& Williams, 2007). More recently, Dobrotić and Blum
(2020) have turned the focus explicitly to access to
parental leave policies rather than measures of generos-
ity in duration and payment, overlaying this with a gen-
der dimension to provide an important addition to con-
ceptualisations of social equality in policy design.
Our framework for comparing the social equality fea-
tures of employment-based paid parental leave policies
draws directly on Dobrotić and Blum’s (2020, p. 599)
eligibility index for a measure of ‘inclusion.’ However,
unlike these authors, who address access to social rights
more broadly, our focus is narrowly on employment-
based systems and their capacity to support our three
separate dimensions of social equality. Hence, we use
the employment-based, but not the citizenship-based,
component of their eligibility index. Our second index,
gender-equality, amalgamates features from the exten-
sive comparative literature on this topic, while our third
index, ‘redistribution,’ requires development from basic
principles. The indices, which we outline below, are con-
ceptualised as equally important dimensions of social
equality that could potentially require trade-offs in prac-
tice. Cross-national analysis provides a lens through
which to assess not only the extent of, and reasons for,
differences on the indices, but also how policy designs
might balance or exacerbate tensions between them.
Although the indices are designed to be applicable
in broader cross-national comparisons, they are suit-
able for our two-country comparison, which applies
them quantitatively only to illustrate major contrasts
before turning to a qualitative exploration of differences
and their implications. This methodological approach is
compatible with a study based on two cases—a com-
parative design that allows for an appropriate balance
between “descriptive depth and analytical challenge”
(Tarrow, 2010, p. 246).
Table 1 sets out the criteria used to score the three
indices, with inclusion, gender equality and redistribu-
tion in panels A, B and C, respectively. In line with
Dobrotić and Blum (2020) they are based solely on statu-
tory provisions, on paid benefits rather than leave entitle-
ments (which often have different eligibility and uptake
provisions) and on ‘parental’ rather than gender-specific
‘maternity’ or ‘paternity’ entitlements. The selection of
criteria and their weighting draws on prior research
where available, but also involves judgements based on
the application of theoretical and substantive knowledge
(see also Dobrotić & Blum, 2020, p. 596).
Drawn from Dobrotić and Blum (2020, p. 599), the
inclusion index (Table 1, panel A) appropriately recog-
nises concerns over inequalities in access due to varia-
tion in labour force attachment and security while omit-
ting eligibility criteria that are not employment-related
(such as access to benefits for the non-birth parent in
same sex couples and for adoptive parents). The dura-
tion of employment (or insurance payments) required
prior to accessing benefits is an important criterion in
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Employment period needed to qualify for benefits b
Without employment-based benefits 0
≥ 12 months of employment 1
7–11 months of employment 2
3–6 months of employment 3
< 3 months of employment 4
Employment contract before leave starts 5
Employment period can be accumulated over longer time with interruptions
Interruptions not allowed 0
Interruptions allowed; condition not applicable c 1
Employment period can be accumulated with different employers
Must be fulfilled with same employer 0
Can be fulfilled with different employers; condition not applicable c 1
Different employment forms and sectors
Self-employed
Excluded 0
Access to separate scheme, can be subject to stricter eligibility criteria 1
Fully included in same scheme as employees 2
Different professions/sectors
Some excluded 0
Some have access to separate scheme, can be subject to stricter eligibility criteria 1
All fully included under same scheme 2
Marginally-employed
Certain level of earnings/working time is needed 0
No conditions related to previous earnings/working time 1
Maximum inclusion score 12
B: Gender equality
Gendered allocation and transferability of leave d
No entitlements for fathers 0
Entitlements primarily for mothers, transferable in special cases 1
Fully shared family, or fully transferable individual, entitlements 2
Family or individual entitlements with < 1/3 non-transferable 3
Family or individual entitlements with ≥ 1/3 non-transferable 4
Duration of well-paid non-transferable leave for fathers e
No well-paid non-transferable leave 0
< 1 month well-paid 1
≥ 1 but < 3 months well-paid 2
≥ 3 but < 6 months well-paid 3
≥ 6 months well-paid 4
Duration of leave for mothers
< 14 weeks, or ≥ 24 months 0
> 14 weeks and < 6 months, or > 12 and < 24 months 1
6 to 12 months 2
Incentives for fathers’ uptake
No 0
Yes 1
Flexibility permitted in usage
Breaks in usage (into two or more separate blocks) 0.5
Part-time usage in combination with part-time return to work 0.5
Maximum gender equality score 12
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No set minimum 0
≤ 20% average wage 1
21–40% average wage 2
41–60% average wage 3
61–80% average wage 4
> 80% average wage 5
Maximum payment/cap
> 200% average wage (or no set maximum) 0
181–200% average wage 1
161–180% average wage 2




Maximum redistribution score 10
Notes: a Panel A is based on the employment-based eligibility criteria in Dobrotić and Blum (2020, p. 599); b this may be specified as
the period of contribution to employment insurance; c not applicable if score is 5 for ‘employment period needed’; d this component of
panel B draws on Dobrotić and Blum’s (2020, pp. 598, 600) “gender dimension of leave policy design”; e ‘well-paid’ is defined as ≥ 66%
of earnings; for flat-rate and capped earnings-based payments, estimates are based on the flat-rate or earnings cap as a percentage of
the average wage for full-time workers.
this context, with a qualifying period of 12 months
or more widely seen as a restrictive barrier (Dobrotić
& Blum, 2020, p. 598). The following two items add
to this lens, capturing—respectively—whether employ-
ment (or insurance payment) interruptions and changes
of employer are permitted during the qualifying period
(concessions oftenmade incrementally as countries seek
to expand the coverage of entitlements). The last three
items capture exclusions. The self-employed are at risk
of exclusion in employment-based systems, where asso-
ciated employment regulations and insurance arrange-
ments are often focused primarily on employees. This
situation might also be echoed for particular profes-
sions or sectors under different regulatory frameworks.
The ‘marginally employed’ are similarly at risk under
employment-based provisions, with exclusions likely to
expand as labour markets become increasingly frag-
mented and the ‘standard employment’ model of per-
manent full-time work erodes. The measure captures
requirements for a specified level of earnings or working
hours (e.g., 20%) to qualify for benefits (Dobrotić & Blum,
2020, p. 598). The scores are weighted to reward short
qualifying periods more heavily, with the index overall
providing a summative measure of access. Inclusion in
this sense, while clearly a crucial component of social
equality, may conflict with other dimensions of as we
note below.
Panel B (Table 1) presents a gender equality index
that seeks to capture the extent to which policy design
is oriented towards the transformation of gendered pat-
terns of paid and unpaid work. In line with the dual
earner/dual caregiver model envisaged by writers such
as Crompton (1999) and Gornick and Meyers (2008),
which in turn echoes Fraser’s (1997, p. 61) utopian vision
of a “Universal Caregiver welfare state,” this requires
strategies that facilitate both mothers’ labour force
attachment and fathers’ engagement in domestic and
caring labour. A central element of this ‘transformative’
vision that has been incorporated into numerous gender
equality indices is the availability and non-transferability
of leave for fathers as critical influences on fathers’
leave uptake (see, e.g., Ciccia & Verloo, 2012; Dearing,
2016; Dobrotić & Blum, 2020; Gornick & Meyers, 2003,
2008; Haas & Rostgaard, 2011; Javornik, 2014; Ray et al.,
2010; Smith & Williams, 2007). Such arrangements vary
considerably between countries, with ‘individual’ enti-
tlements for fathers sometimes fully or partially trans-
ferable to mothers and varying proportions of family
entitlements reserved for fathers (see Koslowski, Blum,
Dobrotić, Kaufman, & Moss, 2020, p. 32). The first set of
items in panel B represents this element in a scale (based
on Dobrotić & Blum, 2020, pp. 598, 600) that allocates
1 point for benefits that are primarily for mothers but
may be transferred in specific circumstances, 2 for fully
transferable family or individual entitlements, 3 for par-
tially non-transferable (< 1/3) family or individual entitle-
ments and 4 for arrangements with ≥ 1/3 of the entitle-
ment period reserved for fathers.
The second set of items in panel B represents another
feature deemed crucial for fathers’ leave uptake and
widely incorporated in gender equality indices: well-paid
leave, defined here as ≥ 66% of earnings (e.g., as in
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Koslowski et al., 2020, p. 44; Ray et al., 2010, p. 202).
We are specifically concerned with the availability of
well-paid non-transferable leave for fathers, given the
importance of this combination for leave uptake (e.g.,
Castro-García & Pazod-Moran, 2016). We also recog-
nise that a very short leave period for fathers, even if
well-paid, may provide minimal challenge to gendered
patterns of work and care. We therefore allocate the
highest score to well-paid non-transferable leave for at
least six months (an ideal individual non-transferable
leave period according to Gornick &Meyers, 2008), with
lower scores for shorter durations. The third set of
items allocates scores for mothers’ leave duration, inclu-
sive of transferable and non-transferable leave as well
as less than well-paid leave (given the likelihood that
most available leave will be taken by mothers; see, e.g.,
Castro-García & Pazod-Moran, 2016). While there is no
consensus on optimal duration, risks such as entrench-
ing maternalism with overly long leaves and exits from
the labour market with very short periods are widely
recognised, with a period of 6 to 12 months generally
accepted as avoiding adverse consequences (see, e.g.,
Ciccia & Verloo, 2012; Dearing, 2016; Javornik, 2014).
We therefore allocate the highest score to this duration,
with lower scores both above and below it. This third set
is weighted less heavily than those for fathers’ leave allo-
cation and payment given the primacy accorded to the
latter in the literature.
Incentives for fathers to access leave (most com-
monly additional leave if both parents use some) are
weighted less heavily again but included in the index
as potential levers for changing gendered patterns of
leave-taking. Similarly, flexibility options may facilitate
leave-taking and career continuity for both mothers
and fathers, in particular by allowing breaks in usage
(in two or more separate blocks) and part-time uptake
(enabling a graduated return to work while still receiv-
ing benefits; see, e.g., Gornick & Meyers, 2008; Haas &
Rostgaard, 2011).
The index is primarily oriented to the goal of trig-
gering change in gendered divisions of paid and unpaid
labour within couple families. Extending gender equality
more broadly, including redressing inequalities between
single mother and single father families, or between
couple and single parent families, may require a dif-
ferent constellation of items (see Jou, Wong, Franken,
Raub, & Heymann, 2020). The composition of the index
also raises questions about the complementarity of the
three dimensions of social equality addressed in this
article. Not only could lower requirements for employ-
ment continuity and labour force attachment (rewarded
in the inclusion index) impede the dual earner/dual care-
giver principle underpinning this gender equality index,
there are also clear conflicts between this index and the
one designed to represent redistribution, as outlined in
the following.
Panel C (Table 1) presents a redistribution index,
which represents a less frequently analysed dimension
of social equality in relation to parental leave policies.
Although redistribution is not a direct goal of parental
leave policy, paid leave entitlements have the potential
to be progressive or regressive in their impact. The extent
to which they ameliorate or reproduce income inequal-
ities among recipients depends in part on funding sys-
tems (with an earnings-based model tending to con-
solidate existing hierarchies) but importantly also on
whether, and at what level, minimum andmaximum pay-
ments are set. Under a generousminimum, low paid and
marginally employed workers may receive higher pay-
ments than their usual wage during the benefit period,
thus providing enhanced support for parenting. In the
absence of empirical evidence on an optimally redistribu-
tiveminimum payment, but with an aspiration for amini-
mum approaching the value of the average wage, we use
a ‘minimum payment’ scale ranging from 0 to > 80% of
the averagewage for full-time employees. Based on quin-
tiles to capture multiple levels of variation, it allocates
scores from 0–5. For consistency, a quintile-based scale
is also used (in reverse) for the maximum payment, start-
ing froman upper limit of 200%of the averagewage. This
limit recognises Gornick andMeyers’ (2008, pp. 324–325,
347) suggestion for a cap on paid leave entitlements of
twice the national average wage, partly to contain costs
but also as a constraint on highly regressive outcomes.
A strongly redistributive policy design could, however,
impose a lower maximum although again there is no
empirical evidence for an optimal level. Given the rela-
tive importance of a high minimum (which would have
themost impact on parental leave poverty) and the desir-
ability of limiting only the highest earners rather than
rewarding cost minimisation, we weight this item less
heavily, allocating scores of 0–3 across successively lower
income bands, with the lowest set at ≤ 160% of the
average wage for full-time workers. To preserve this bal-
ance between lower and upper limits, another means of
restricting payments to high earners, an income test for
access, is not included in the index.
An additional component of the redistribution index,
accorded lower weighting again as its impact is less
direct, is the taxation of benefits. Gornick and Meyers’
(2008, p. 347) suggestion that, in the interests of pro-
gressivity, “a portion of high-income recipients’ benefits
could be taxed” is extended here to taxation of benefits
for all recipients. While the impact of such a measure
depends on the progressiveness of the income tax scale,
it represents a principle consistent with redistribution.
Overall, the importance of this index lies in broad-
ening the focus of social equality analyses of parental
leave provisions. Although it requires further testing and
refinement, it provides a starting point for such exten-
sion. It also draws attention to complementarities and
conflicts with other dimensions of social equality—for
example, the clear tension between limiting maximum
payments here and the priority given to a high replace-
ment wage in the interests of fathers’ leave uptake in the
gender equality index. These and related complexities
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will be drawn out in the ensuing comparison of Australia
and Japan and in our conclusion.
3. Comparing Paid Parental Leave Policies in Australia
and Japan on Dimensions of Social Equality
3.1. Comparing Contexts and Outlining the Policies
Despite contrasting institutional and cultural traditions,
Australia and Japan display similarities as well as dif-
ferences in welfare state characteristics and gendered
work/family models. Australia, while classified among
the ‘liberal welfare states’ (following Esping-Andersen,
1990), retains some vestiges of its history of what
Castles (1989) depicted as “social protection by other
means”—i.e., the high wages and social protections
delivered through a strongly regulated wage-setting sys-
tem bolstered by industry protection and restricted
immigration. An important legacy of this history is the
lack of a contributory social insurance scheme, which
never gained political support in this context (see, e.g.,
Whitehouse, 2004). Japan, while exhibiting aspects of
both liberal residualism and conservative occupational
segmentation and familialism (Esping-Andersen, 1997),
also has a history of social protection by other means—
in this case through lifelong and full employment as
forms of occupational welfare (Hwang, 2016). In con-
trast with Australia, it maintains a contributory employ-
ment insurance scheme. While economic liberalisation
has reshaped welfare systems in both countries, this has
led in different directions: Australia’s system has become
increasingly residual while Japan’s has expanded, at least
partly in response to demographic pressures (Hwang,
2016; Peng, 2002).
Within these welfare state configurations, both coun-
tries retain versions of a male breadwinner model.
Australia’s was institutionalised early in a needs-based
family wage for white men and persists in partially mod-
ified form in a “maternal part-time work/care regime”
(Whitehouse & Brady, 2019, p. 258). Path dependen-
cies associatedwithmale breadwinner norms and liberal
philosophies of governments have impeded Australia’s
move beyond maternalism in parental leave policy
(Newsome, 2019),making it an extreme case evenwithin
Anglophone liberal welfare states, which—as Baird and
O’Brien (2015) note—have made limited advancement
on gender equality in leave policies. In Japan, strongmale
breadwinner norms have been deeply embedded in the
lifetime employment and seniority wages system for
men and the associated ‘reproductive bargain’ that allo-
cates responsibility for family care to women (Gottfried,
2015). Although lifetime employment has been eroded
to some extent, the male breadwinner model continues
to be reflected in highly gender-segmented labour mar-
kets. Women are significantly overrepresented in periph-
eral insecure work (Gottfried & O’Reilly, 2002) and high
levels of commitment and long hours are demanded
from those in the core labour market (Boling, 2015;
Brinton & Mun, 2016). In this context, a significant pro-
portion ofwomen exit the labourmarket before the birth
of a child (Nakazato, 2019, p. 106). Thus, while Japan has
been able to extend its parental leave provisions, there
are considerable pressures limiting uptake.
This contextual shaping of paid parental leave pol-
icy underpins a complex set of cross-national similari-
ties and differences. A basic similarity is that both coun-
tries have ‘parental’ leave provisions consistent with
the definition of “a care-related right available to both
mothers and fathers” (Dobrotić & Blum, 2020, p. 589).
Both extend these entitlements to birth and adoptive
parents, although Japan’s provisions do not include the
non-birth parent in same-sex couples. However, neither
country offers the combination of maternity, paternity
and parental leave that is commonly observed in Europe,
at least not formally under those terms. In Australia,
‘parental leave’ is the term used for the individual entitle-
ment to unpaid leave of 12 months for each parent, with
‘parental leave pay’ used for the payment available under
the Paid Parental Leave scheme that commenced oper-
ation in 2011. The latter provides up to 18 weeks pay-
ment for the child’s primary carer. Despite the gender-
neutral wording the payment is directed initially to the
mother who may subsequently transfer all or part of it
in specified circumstances. Since 2013, these arrange-
ments have been supplemented with a 2-week ‘dad and
partner pay’ benefit solely for fathers/partners. This is
equivalent to a short paternity leave payment although
the term ‘paternity’ is avoided in the interests of sig-
nalling availability to same-sex couples. Both schemes
are paid at a flat rate aligned with the national minimum
wage, funded through general revenue.
In Japan, the two forms of paid leave available are
termed maternity (literally ‘pre-natal and post-natal’)
leave and parental (literally ‘childcare’) leave. The for-
mer provides the birth mother with benefits for up to
six weeks prior to and eight weeks after the birth; the
latter (which is the focus of our analysis) is an individ-
ual 12-month entitlement available to both parents for
use within the first 12 months of the child’s life (a period
that can be extended to a maximum of 14 months from
the child’s birth if the father takes some leave). While
there is no paternity leave as such, the provision to
allow fathers to take a portion of their parental leave
entitlement during the first eight weeks after the birth
can be seen as allowing a period of leave for fathers
commensurate with a mother’s ‘maternity leave.’ The
parental leave scheme is funded through employment
insurance, providing earnings-based payments set at
67% for the first 180 days of parental leave, then 50%
for the remainder.
Further details on the policies under investigation are
drawn out in the analysis that follows.We focus on policy
design differences relating to inclusion, gender equality
and redistribution, reflecting on the influence of the con-
textual factors we have outlined.
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3.2. Comparing Policies on Inclusion, Gender Equality
and Redistribution
Scores for Australia and Japan on each of the items that
comprise the indices in Table 1 are given in Table A1
(see Supplementary File). Figure 1 presents the index
scores as percentages, consistent with our depiction of
the indices as representing equally important dimen-
sions of social equality. As Figure 1 shows, the countries
performed very differently on the three indices, most
markedly on gender equality where Japan recorded a
full score while Australia only achieved 21%. However,
Australia scoredmore highly than Japan on the other two
indices, particularly on redistribution. These differences
are explored in the sub-sections below.
3.2.1. Inclusion
The contrast shown in Figure 1, with Australia scoring
67% and Japan 42% in the inclusion index, is due to
variation on two components of the index: the employ-
ment period required to qualify for benefits and the inclu-
sion of self-employed workers (for country scores on the
items discussed here and in the following sub-sections
see Table A1 in the Supplementary File). Examination of
these differences, including some more subtle contrasts
not captured by the index, suggests where barriers to
inclusion lie in spite of attempts in both countries to
develop broadly inclusive measures.
Australia’s marginally higher score on the ‘employ-
ment period needed to qualify for benefits’ criterion
reflects the flexibility of its work test, which requires
employment during 10 of the 13 months prior to the
birth, for at least 330 hours (equivalent to around one
day per week) in that 10-month period (Whitehouse,
Baird, & Baxter, 2020, p. 83). The test was explicitly
designed to be more inclusive than Australia’s unpaid
parental leave, which (as an entitlement located in
the industrial relations regulatory framework) requires
12 months with the same employer prior to access.
Funding of the payment scheme through general rev-
enue, while introducing complexities by locating leave
and payment in different regulatory arenas, allowed the
flexibility to expand eligibility in ways that acknowledged
the likely irregularity of women’s employment patterns.
In Japan, eligibility requires a minimum of 12 months
insurance contributions over the past two years, which
places it in the more restrictive category of ≥ 12 months
of employment for qualification. However, the benefit is
available to employees with irregular working patterns,
the lower limit being a work history of 11 or more days
in each of those 12 months (Nakazato, Nishimura, &
Takezawa, 2020, p. 356).
Both countries score points for allowing interrup-
tions and changes of employer during the qualifying
period for access to payments. In Australia, inclusiveness
has been further widened recently with an extension of
the permitted period of interruption between work days
from eight to 12 weeks (Whitehouse et al., 2020, p. 88).
Turning to the criteria under ‘different employ-
ment forms and sectors,’ Japan’s exclusion of the self-
employed reflects the scope of its employment insur-
ance system, but neither country excludes particular pro-
fessions or sectors, or those below a specified earnings
level. As we have outlined above, both impose access
limits based on working time: the equivalent of around
one day per week in Australia and 11 days per month
in Japan during the qualifying periods. Although beyond
our focus on statutory provisions, we also note that
employers in Japan are not obliged to have employees
working < 20 hours/week covered by employment insur-
ance, hence many of these workers may be ineligible
for benefits. For employees on fixed-term contracts (i.e.,
those with a specified end date), there are no explicit
restrictions in Australia other than tomeet the work test,
which may still exclude some depending on the timing
Figure 1. Inclusion, gender equality and redistribution in paid parental leave policy, Australia and Japan, 2020.
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and duration of the employment term. In Japan, fixed-
term employees can access leave (and thus payment,
which cannot be received in the absence of the leave
entitlement) provided the employee has been with the
employer continuously for 12 months and it is not obvi-
ous that the contract will end before the child reaches
18 months and not be extended (Nakazato et al., 2020,
p. 356). While differences in the classification of employ-
ment types in national statistics preventmeaningful com-
parison between the countries on the implications of
these restrictions, we note that both countries have
highly-divided labour markets, with a persistently high
proportion of employees in non-standard (‘non-regular’
in Japan) employment (Cooke& Jiang, 2017;Whitehouse
& Brady, 2019, p. 260).
Overall, differences in inclusiveness between the
countries are at least partly attributable to funding
arrangements, with Japan’s employment insurance
model requiring a higher level of workforce engage-
ment than Australia’s government-funded system.
Additionally, while both countries have marked labour
market divisions, the distinction between regular and
non-regular status is particularly strong in Japan, with
non-regular (including part-time) work providing lim-
ited access to employment and social welfare benefits
(Boling, 2015, p. 152). In both cases there is a risk of
the further erosion of access with increases in marginal
forms of employment. While these pressures, and the
current less than optimal performance of both coun-
tries on this index, raise concerns for inclusion, there
are also questions over how inclusive employment-
based systems can become without eroding other
dimensions of social equality (an issue we return to in
the conclusion).
3.2.2. Gender Equality
As Figure 1 shows, the countries differ most on the gen-
der equality index, with Australia scoring only 21% com-
pared with Japan’s 100%. The discrepancy is greatest on
the first two items. Australia’s low score on ‘gendered
allocation and transferability of leave’ reflects its direc-
tion of parental leave payments primarily to mothers.
While there are provisions for its transfer to another
carer in specified circumstances (see Whitehouse et al.,
2020, pp. 82–83), the initial recipient is the mother.
In contrast, Japan’s fully non-transferable individual enti-
tlements place it at the top of this scale.
On ‘duration of well-paid non-transferable leave for
fathers,’ Australia scores 0, with none of the parental
leave payment entitlement well-paid or reserved for
fathers. While the limited benefit available under ‘dad
and partner pay’ is non-transferable, it is in effect a short
paternity rather than a parental leave entitlement and
is not well-paid. In contrast, Japan receives the maxi-
mum score for its 12-month individual non-transferable
entitlement for fathers paid at 67% of previous earnings
for the first 180 days. Although capped, the maximum
monthly benefit for this period is 94% of the average
monthly wage (based on 2019 figures).
Turning to ‘duration of leave for mothers,’ Australia
scores one point for its 18-week entitlement but Japan
scores 2 for the optimal category of ‘6–12 months.’
While there is provision for an extension of parental
leave in Japan when a childcare place is not available—
circumstances in which Japan would score only 1 point
(for > 12 but < 24 months)—we use the general rule
rather than the exception for scoring.
Only Japan scores a point for ‘incentives for fathers’
uptake.’ In 2010, an additional two months of leave was
provided, extending the permissible leave-taking period
from 12 to 14 months after the child’s birth if the father
takes at least two months’ leave, or by a lesser amount
if the father takes < 2 months (this does not, how-
ever, change the 12-months maximum for each parent.)
On the ‘flexibility’ items, Australia scores a half-point for
a recently introduced provision that allows the 18-week
entitlement to be split into an initial 12-week block to be
used in the first 12 months, with the remainder acces-
sible any time during the first two years (for further
details see Whitehouse et al., 2020, p. 89). Both of the
listed flexibility items are available in Japan, where, since
2010, fathers can take some of their leave entitlement
during the first eight weeks following a birth and a sec-
ond block at a later stage within the permitted period
of up to 14 months after the child’s birth (Nakazato
et al., 2020, p. 356). Mothers may also take a break
between their maternity leave and parental leave, but
each of those entitlements must be taken in a continu-
ous block. Additionally, in Japan benefit recipients may
return to work part-time for up to 80 hours during a
monthly payment period, in which case the benefit is
adjusted so that the sum of their earnings and benefit
does not exceed 80% of their earnings prior to taking
leave. These subtleties in comparison underline the com-
plexity of national policy designs and the varying ways in
which incremental changes can extend the capacity for
gender equality, at least at the margins.
More fundamental changes are inevitably con-
strained by welfare state and gender norms, only rarely
gaining political traction. Australia’s poor overall perfor-
mance on this index reflects path dependencies in fund-
ing arrangements and a residual and maternalist welfare
state. Japan’s capacity to innovate stems from the con-
fluence of systemic factors (specifically the suitability
of individual entitlements within an employment insur-
ance system and the contributory funding arrangements
that reduced the direct cost to government of successive
increases towards the current generous benefit levels)
and the expansion of its welfare state from the 1990s
in response to “gender and demographic imperatives”
(Peng, 2002, p. 412). These imperatives included the
pressures of women’s activism and the increasing atten-
tion to gender equality in public discourse following pas-
sage of the Basic Act for a Gender Equal Society in 1999
as well as persistent concerns over falling fertility rates
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(see Nakazato, 2019). The frequency of references to
fathers’ low take-up rates in parliamentary discussions
in the early 2000s, and the policy amendments subse-
quently designed to redress this problem, illustrate the
political salience of the issue over a sustained period.
An important caveat is that, in spite of gener-
ous gender-egalitarian provisions, take-up rates among
fathers are very low in Japan. A survey of private enter-
prises in 2019 showed that 7.48%ofmaleworkerswhose
spouse had given birth between 1 October 2017 and
30 September 2018 had started or applied for paid
parental leave by 1 October 2019 (Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare, 2020, p. 22). Without change in the
expectation of high levels of commitment and long work-
ing hours for full-time permanent workers that remain
persistent features of Japanese corporate culture and
shape managers’ attitudes towards parental leave (see
Brinton & Mun, 2016), this disjunction between gender
egalitarian design and gender equality in practice is likely
to persist (the different model of paid parental leave in
Australia and lack of relevant statistics prevent compari-
son of the two countries on uptake levels).
Overall, differences between the countries on the
gender equality index are again significantly shaped
by the contrasting funding systems. Japan’s contribu-
tory social insurance scheme (seen in the previous sec-
tion as partially constraining the flexibility for widening
inclusiveness) enables higher payments than those pos-
sible within Australia’s general revenue arrangements.
However, this contrast in payment systems has a differ-
ent set of implications for our third index.
3.2.3. Redistribution
As indicated in Figure 1, Australia ranks considerably
higher than Japan on the redistribution index, scoring
80%comparedwith Japan’s 40%.Differences on the ‘min-
imumpayment’ component reflect the contrast between
Australia’s flat-rate, and Japan’s earnings-based, pay-
ment systems. Set at the national minimum wage,
Australia’s arrangements provide recipients with 44% of
the full-time average weekly wage (based on 2019 fig-
ures for consistency of comparison between the two
countries). The benefit is paid at the full-time rate, thus
providing some recipients with higher payments during
their leave period than in their pre-leave employment.
In Japan,while there is aminimummonthly payment, it is
set at a comparatively low level, varying in 2019 between
15%of averagemonthly earnings for full-time employees
(for the first 180 days) and 12% (for the remainder of the
entitlement). This wide discrepancy between the coun-
tries highlights the comparatively regressive effect of
earnings-based funding arrangements, with Australia’s
high minimum wage further widening the gap between
the two countries.
On the ‘maximumpayment/cap’ item, both countries
fall into the ≤ 160% average wage category, hence both
receive full scores. Under Australia’s flat-rate system, the
maximum is the same as the minimum (44% of the
average wage), while Japan’s maximum payment (repre-
sented by a cap on its earnings-based benefit) is equiv-
alent to 94% of the average wage for full-time employ-
ees for the first 180 days of the entitlement, reducing to
70% for the remainder. Although these are very differ-
ent levels (and Australia also imposes an income test on
access which is not captured in the index), even Japan’s
higher maximum is well below the cut-offs applied here
for reduced scores due to ‘regressive’ levels of maxi-
mum payments.
On the final component of this index, ‘payments tax-
able,’ only Australia gains points. Taxation of benefitswas
adopted in Australia both as consistent with redistribu-
tive goals and as a means of distinguishing the benefit
from awelfare payment (Productivity Commission, 2009,
p. 27). In combination with a flat-rate payment, which
was a clear disadvantage for the gender equality index
but is advantageous here, this produces a wide gap in
overall scores between the two countries. While Japan
places caps on high payments, it also sets very low min-
imum payments, thus significantly limiting the capacity
for redistributive benefits.
4. Conclusion
Australia and Japan represent distinctive manifestations
of selective employment-based paid parental leave enti-
tlement systems with differing capacities for advancing
social equality within their policy designs. This is clearly
illustrated in their disparities both within and between
the three indices used in this analysis. While their provi-
sions are continually being modified through incremen-
tal adjustments, these are unlikely to erode the main
dissimilarities between them or produce optimal out-
comes in either country in the near future. Although
Japan’s innovations on gender equality (which underpin
the starkest difference between the two countries) are
a reminder that radical policy changes can occur, they
also indicate that complementary changes in social and
labour market norms are essential if gender egalitarian
policy design is to be translated into gender equality
in outcomes.
Among the lessons fromour comparison is the impor-
tance of funding systems as drivers of policy differ-
ence. A contributory employment insurance scheme
has distinct advantages for the generosity of payments:
Australia’s general revenue funding model renders any-
thing other than a flat-rate payment politically con-
tentious, while Japan’s insurance model presented less
of a barrier to claims in that country for more gen-
erous entitlements. However, there is no consistent
‘winner’ between insurance-based and general revenue-
based systems across the three dimensions of social
equality under examination here. While gender equal-
ity is enhanced by the more generous payments avail-
able under an insurance scheme, Australia’s higher
score in relation to inclusion at least partly reflects its
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government-funded benefit scheme which allowed for
less restrictive eligibility criteria than those applying
to its unpaid leave benefit under employment regula-
tion. Although extensions of coverage are not impossi-
ble under a social insurance scheme, the requirement for
contributions in return for benefits may place stronger
limits on the extent to which eligibility can be expanded.
Moreover, general revenue funding (to the extent that it
predisposes to modest flat-rate benefits) has the capac-
ity to enhance redistribution—essentially by avoiding
the inbuilt regressivity in earnings-based systems that
are more likely to be supported by insurance funding.
As Blofield and Martínez Franzoni (2015) argue, contrib-
utory systems benefit higher earners and standard full-
time workers disproportionately.
These tensions between our three dimensions high-
light the complexities of social equality as a normative
vision, raising questions over whether explicit trade-offs
are needed between them. One strategy could be to pri-
oritise building on complementary features. For example,
high minimum benefits potentially enhance both class
and gender equality through supporting the (dispropor-
tionately female) lower paid and marginally employed.
Other tensions, such as the tendency of looser eligi-
bility criteria to undermine the dual earner/dual care-
giver family model that underpins gender equality goals,
may require calculated trade-offs, although the mea-
sures noted in the following paragraph could significantly
lessen this conflict.
Ultimately a more socially egalitarian context is
needed to enable the translation of social equality in
policy design into egalitarian outcomes—as Moss and
Deven (1999) have perceptively noted in relation to gen-
der equality. Rather than a disabling circularity, this
observation underlines the importance of a complemen-
tary set of social equality policies, both in response
to widening inequality generally (e.g., through increas-
ingly progressive taxation) and particularly in relation
to deepening labour market divisions (through employ-
ment regulation). Similarly, narrowing the gender pay
gap would reduce the tension between conflicting pres-
sures for high payments to encourage fathers’ leave
uptake and limiting regressive distribution of benefits.
A more egalitarian labour market would reduce the like-
lihood that social equality provisions in policy design fail
to translate into equality in outcomes or exacerbate ten-
sions between gender equality and inclusion. While this
broader regulatory framework is not on the agenda in
Australia or Japan, it is the context in which employment-
based paid parental leave policies have the greatest
potential to contribute to a more egalitarian future.
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